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We used matched employer-employee data for the period 1992-1997 to analyse the 
transition from work to early retirement in Norway. We focus on the effect of a new early 
retirement scheme ("AFP") of which some 60 percent of the population is eligible. We thus 
observe individuals in two different incentive systems and estimate the reallocation effect 
between employment and different early retirement, notably AFP and disability pension. 
There is a substantial drop in employment for the group entitled to AFP. However, while 
AFP has an increasingly negative effect on the labour supply, there seem to be almost no 
corresponding reduction in the incidence of disability pension during the period of 
investigation.   
 
Our data includes a broad range of individual, workplace and industry characteristics. We 
report a relatively high degree of heterogeneity in the retirement behaviour, notably 
between genders, but also between industries and sectors. Push as well as pull factors are 
identified. The former appears to be more relevant for the disability pathway, while the 
latter turns out to be significant when retiring to AFP.  
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1. Introduction 
Early retirement affects the age structure of the work force, reduces the supply of labor and 
contributes significantly to financial pressure on the welfare state. In a pay-as-you-go 
social security system, which is the most common form in Western countries, large-scale 
early retirement exacerbates the already large crisis in how benefits for the retired are to be 
financed in steadily aging populations (Van Dalen 1996; Börsch-Supan 2000). Even though 
Norway has substantial petroleum revenues and possesses extensive financial assets, 
mostly accumulated in the Government Petroleum Fund, the country faces economic 
challenges arising from demographic shifts (NOU 2004: 1). The average retirement age is 
falling, while the proportion of elderly people is rising, a trend that will continue in the next 
few decades. By 2050, almost 25 percent of the population is projected to be 65 and over; it 
currently stands at 14 percent (OECD 2004). 
  Even though labor force participation rates have fallen around 20 percent the 
last 30 years, in particular for men, the employment rates are high in Norway compared 
with other EU countries. Around 50 percent of the population aged 60 to 64 is employed. 
The average for the 15 EU countries in 2001 was 24 percent (33 percent for men and 16 
percent for women). 
  During the last 30 years the Norwegian economy (together with the other 
Western economies) has gone through a major restructuring process. Key elements behind 
the restructuring are the liberalization of international trade, deregulation, and new 
technology, notably within the information and communication sector. These are the major 
ingredients in the globalization process. Globalization implies increased competition, 
increased degree of out-sourcing, and privatization, which in turn leads to changes in the 
demand for labor. High-skilled labor replaces low-skilled, and short-term employment  
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contracts replace long-term contracts, the rotation between jobs increases, and wages are 
increasingly determined by incentive contracts and profit-sharing instead of (centralized) 
negotiations.  
  Increased national and international competition may have a different effect on 
older workers than the rest of the workforce. Even in industries and sectors characterized 
by expansion, older persons seeking work often may find it difficult to get a new job 
because employers are worried that the costs connected to hiring and investing in them is 
higher than the benefit, and question their training potential, adaptability, and health. On 
the other hand, downsizing companies may encourage older workers to take early 
retirement. For example Norway’s second largest industrial company, Norsk Hydro, laid 
off more than 5000 employees in 2002 using severance packages and early retirement 
arrangements that offering 70 percent of the former salary (Økonomisk Rapport 16/2002). 
Using such arrangements, the company avoided normal seniority rules. Early retirement 
arrangements are often otherwise in demand by employees who wish to retire, without any 
pressure from the employer (Dahl and Nesheim 1998).  
  This article is based on a dataset containing merged employer-employee data. In 
addition to controlling for a broad range of individual characteristics, we will study the 
effect of firm heterogeneity on early retirement and exit from the labor force. More 
specifically, we control for sector and industry indicators, allowing us to look for different 
retirement behaviors like in sheltered versus competitive industries or in the public versus 
the private sector. Furthermore, the nature of our data allows us to construct (group) data 
on firm characteristics, like size, age and educational profile, share of the different genders, 
and share of part-time workers. In addition, our sample consists of a panel of individuals 
covering the period 1992 to 1997 during which a major retirement reform was enacted that 
opened an additional pathway to retirement for workers over 62. Notably, the reform  
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covers only 60 percent of the firms, allowing us to compare the effect of this additional 
(privately negotiated) early retirement scheme, called AFP, with the control group of firms 
without entitlement to this form of early retirement. Combined with our individual and firm 
information, we are able to test whether the introduction of a more generous pension 
system has a homogeneous effect across the selected characteristics, or whether the effect 
differs across gender, income, expected pension, industry, firm characteristics, or other 
factors. Following Dahl, Nilsen and Vaage (2003), we conduct separate analyses of males 
and females, as we expect to find significant differences due to the high degree of gender 
segregation in the Norwegian labor market.  
  We use data from several Norwegian administrative registers that combine 
individual characteristics and information on the firm in which each individual works. Our 
sample consists of all individuals born in the period from 1929-32, employed at age 63, 
where each cohort consists of around 10,000 workers. These individuals are followed from 
January 1992 until they make a transition from work to one of the three transition states we 
analyze, or until the end of the observation period in December 1997. We use a discrete 
choice model with three destination states: Early retirement (AFP), disability pension (DP), 
and out of the labor force (OLF). The base category is employment. Our study allows us to 
analyze the effect on labor supply of giving the option of early retirement (AFP) to all 
workers, and the effect on labor supply of removing that option. 
  In the following section we briefly review some recent and relevant national 
literature on retirement. Then we describe institutional features of the Norwegian 
retirement system in an international context. This is followed by a description of the 
sample together with modeling and explanatory variables. In the subsequent section we 
comment on the development in the probabilities of ending up in various end-states, and on 
the empirical results. The last section provides a more general discussion of the results.  
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2. National Research  
The last years, several micro econometric analyses based on Norwegian data have been 
published (for further studies using Nordic data, see Wadensjö 1996), two of which are of a 
privately negotiated early retirement scheme (AFP). Hernæs, Sollie and Strøm’s (2000) 
prime motivation was to model the likely effects of changing the eligibility criteria in the 
AFP scheme. Using a competing risks framework, they found that the AFP to some degree 
relieves the pressure on disability pension and unemployment benefits.  
  Dahl, Nilsen and Vaage (2000) analyze early retirement pathways for 
Norwegian male and female workers. Family characteristics, expected income in different 
end-states, and push factors, such as industry attachment and local unemployment, are 
found to be important for the early retirement process. The gender difference in early 
retirement is given attention in Dahl, Nilsen and Vaage (2003). The competing risks model 
indicated that women are less likely to take early retirement compared with men and that 
these differences are due to both different characteristics and different behavior. 
  Bratberg, Holmås and Thøgersen (2004) investigate induced retirement effects 
of the AFP scheme and emphasize effects caused by moving some individuals from 
disability pension and unemployment to the AFP. Using Norwegian register data from 
1994-96, they find that economic incentives influence the retirement decision, that there is 
a significant net induced retirement effect, and that at least 50 percent of the AFP retirees 
would have stayed in the labor force without the scheme.  
  Two studies use almost the same data set as we are using. Tysse (2001) finds 
that many employees leave their employer in order to receive AFP benefits at the first 
possible opportunity. Enterprise characteristics contribute significantly to explaining early 
retirement. The effect of each enterprise characteristic varies strongly according to which 
exit is being analyzed, whether men or women are being considered, and whether they are  
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entitled to AFP or not. Røed and Haugen (2003) consider the introduction of AFP as a 
‘quasi-natural’ experiment and use this to evaluate how economic incentives affect 
retirement behavior. The results show that the new retirement option reduced employment 
substantially, and this effect has escalated over time. Economic incentives and family 
situation play key roles. AFP is not found to substitute for disability pension or long-term 
unemployment, and this contradicts Bratberg, Holmås and Thøgersen (2004), who found 
large substitution effects between various exit routes. Retirement through AFP is found to 
primarily be voluntary, but there is some evidence that employers took advantage of the 
program and pushed out excess workers.  
  There are also qualitatively oriented studies that have analyzed early retirement 
with a focus on practices by enterprises. Using data from interviews with personnel 
managers, trade union representatives, and medical officers in 23 Norwegian firms, Dahl 
and Nesheim (1998) showed that companies, at least during downsizing and 
reorganization, actively put older employees under pressure to retire early instead of laying 
off younger employees. Older workers are both pushed and pulled into different (early 
retirement) schemes like unemployment insurance, AFP, company paid early retirement 
and disability pension. Older workers are for example encouraged or told by their employer 
to go to the doctor to get sickness benefits to begin with, and disability pension later on 
(Bjørndal, Johnsen and Clementsen 1990). The employees usually have some kind of 
disease, but typically not of a kind that would prevent them from working. The 
encouragement comes when firms downsize and reorganize.  
  Our study differs from most of the studies just noted. First, we pay special 
attention to female retirement and gender differences in the retirement decision. Second, 
our data make it possible to distinguish between different pathways. This is important, as it 
captures the forces behind the choice of various early retirement options. Third, our data  
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contains important information both on individual characteristics and about the company in 
which the individual works. Thus, we can test which variables are important for explaining 
employment and early retirement. 
3. Institutional Background 
Norwegian labor force participation rates among older workers are high by OECD 
standards, particularly among women.
2 Among women aged 50-64, that participation has 
increased from 46 percent in 1972 to just over 70 percent in 2002, though in the same time 
period it declined from 30 to 18 percent among the oldest (65-69 year old) women. The 
participation rate for men aged 50-54 and 55-59 has more or less remained at the 1972 
level, but the decline for men over 60 has been steep until 2002: for the 60-64 year olds, it 
dropped from 80 to 60 percent, but among the 65-69 year olds, it plummeted from three-
fourths (76 percent) to one-fourth (24 percent).  
  The number of jobs held by individuals aged 50 to 64 has increased by 168,000 
(42 percent) since 1993. 86 percent of older workers in Norway are classified as 
employees, of whom only 3 percent are in temporary jobs, while the remaining 14 percent 
are self-employed. By industry, older workers are underrepresented in “construction”, 
“wholesale and retail”, “transport, storage and communication” and “financial, real estate 
and business services”, but overrepresented in “agriculture, hunting and fishing” and 
“public administration, education, health and social work.” The latter sector accounts for 
over 40 percent of all jobs for older persons and more than 60 percent in the case of older 
women. By occupation, older women are concentrated in professional-related and, 
                                                 
 
2  When comparing Norway with other OECD countries the information in this section is collected from OECD (2004) 





especially for women, service-oriented occupations, and are over-represented in the 
category of legislators, managers, and senior officials. However, more than a third of older 
men in employment still work in manual occupations.  
  As in other OECD countries, there has been a shift away from the production of 
goods to the production of services. Since 1995 the number of hours worked has declined 
at least five hours per week for older and prime aged workers. The drop has been most 
severe for men and women aged 60-64 whose hours per week have dropped nearly nine 
hours and seven hours, respectively. In 2001 men and women in this age group on average 
worked less than 30 and 20 hours per week. Older men in Norway work the fewest hours in 
the OECD and Norwegian women have the second lowest hours of work. The major 
reasons are a relatively high incidence of part-time work
3, and absence from work (illness, 
holidays, variable hours). Taking actual hours worked into account reduces employment 
rates substantially.  
  The unemployment rates for older workers in Norway have tracked those of 
prime-aged workers, though at a lower level. In the last years, it has been between 1 and 2 
percent, among the lowest rates in the OECD-area. There is no significant difference in 
unemployment rates by level of education for older workers. The educational level for 
older people is relatively high in comparison with other OECD countries: 22 percent of 
those aged 50-64 have a tertiary education. 40 percent of older workers received job-related 
training in Norway, but that is still 13 percentage points lower than for prime-aged 
workers. The high incidence can be ascribed to a growing emphasis on training in 
                                                 










collective bargaining agreements as well as a number of governmental measures to 
encourage greater participation in training. Working conditions for those over 55 are 
reportedly better than for those who are younger, and fewer older workers want to change 
jobs than do prime-age workers. They seem to occupy more independent jobs and value the 
social aspects of their jobs more highly. The mobility of older workers is low, and Schøne 
(2001) and Hunnes, Møen and Salvanes (2004) found that job mobility between firms 
decreases with age and work experience. Huttunen, Møen and Salvanes (2004) also found 
that older workers are less likely to get a job after lay offs compared with younger workers. 
The substantial drop in labor market participation starts at age 59-60 for both men and 
women. At this age the share of persons outside the labor market more than doubles, as 
compared with those who are in their early 50s. In contrast to many other countries, 
Norway has only two major exit paths before the statutory pension age of 67 – the 
disability pension and the early retirement scheme (AFP). In 2000, more than 85 percent of 
the men and 66 percent of the women in the 50-59 age group who left the labor market did 
so because of illness and disability. The share is a bit lower in the 60-64 age group. By the 
end of 2003, 10.4 percent (301,214 persons) of the population aged 18-67 were receiving 
disability pensions, a 3.1 percent increase from the year before (RTV 2004). The number is 
expected to rise to 355,000 by 2010. Of those receiving disability pensions, 57.4 percent 
were women; 57.3 percent were 55 or older, and 35.1 percent were over 60.  
  In addition, there has been a steady increase in the number of those with long-
term illness (defined as lasting more than 16 days). On average, about 1.5 weeks of full-
time work per year per person (equaling seven working days) are lost because of illness. 
There is a clear connection between days on sick leave and both gender and age. In general, 
women are more absent than men, and older people are more absent than younger. The  
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route to a disability pension usually goes through sickness insurance, and thus sickness 
insurance has become a major exit path for older workers.
4  
  The standard retirement age in Norway is 67, conditional on a person giving up 
the right to keep a specific job. However, some professions and occupations have a lower 
pension age and some ages are fixed by law. The compulsory retirement age is 70.
5 
Expenditures on public pensions in Norway account for about 5 percent of GDP. However, 
due to the aging of the population and the maturing of the supplementary pension scheme, 
this is projected to reach 13 percent by 2050 – at which point there will be an expected 1.3 
million pensioners, more than double the current number (NOU 2004: 1). These worrying 
prospects led to the appointment of a pension commission that in January 2004 
recommended strengthening the link between earned income and entitlements, and 
introducing a flexible retirement age starting at 62 that would carry no restrictions for 
combining work and pension income.  
  There is no public early retirement scheme in Norway. However, as in several 
other countries, institutional arrangements that were originally constructed for other 
purposes, notably unemployment benefits and disability pension, have been used as 
pathways to early retirement. Until the early 1990s, the entitlement conditions for disability 
pension in Norway were liberal, and labor market conditions (a low chance of finding a 
new job) were a factor in the disability assessment and determination. Before receiving a 
disability pension, sickness insurance is usually paid for one year, and a subsequent period 
in a rehabilitation program is required. To qualify for a disability pension, a person must 
                                                 
4     Before receiving a disability pension, sickness insurance is usually paid for one year, and a subsequent period in a    
       rehabilitation programme is required. To qualify for a disability pension, a person must demonstrate that his/her 
       ability to earn an income has been permanently reduced by at least 50 per cent. 
 
5     After reaching the age of 70 a person receive full pension even if s/he continue to work. A person who retire between 
       the age of 67 and 70 will receive full pension if they stop working or earn less than twice the basic unit used in the  
       pension system (G). If the earn more than 2 G (in 2004  NOK 117,556, appr. €  14,200)  their pension will be reduced 
       proportionally.  
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demonstrate their ability to earn an income has been permanently reduced by at least 50 
percent.  
  Older people are entitled to unemployment insurance for an extended period. 
Persons who are unemployed at 64 are entitled to unemployment insurance without 
limitations until they reach the standard retirement age of 67. Before reaching age 64, it is 
possible to be unemployed for 186 weeks which means it is possible to receive 
unemployment benefits starting at age 60.5. It is also the case that labor requirements 
associated with an active labor market policy (occupational and geographic mobility, 
nature of the job search) are relaxed for those over 60, so unemployment becomes a 
genuine exit route.  
  There are several early retirement pathways with private provisions in Norway, 
though they are not commonly used. The most important, the AFP scheme, came into 
effect in 1989. The question about flexible retirement came up as part of the wage 
negations between the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and the 
Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO) in 1988. Increasing inflation, 
unemployment (also long-term) and disability rates were important reasons behind the 
introduction of the AFP scheme. Downsizing became more common in the second half of 
the 1980s, and both LO and NHO found the existing early retirement options – 
unemployment benefits and disability pension – unsuitable and unworthy exits for older 
workers. The government’s financial support, which covers 40 per cent of the expenses of 
the scheme (the rest is covered by the employers), was made conditional on a wage 
increase not higher than 5 percent in 1988, and not higher than in the most important 
trading partners in 1989. The retirement age in the scheme has gradually been reduced 
from 66 year in 1989, 65 years in 1990, 64 years in 1993, 63 years in 1997 and to 62 years 
in 1998. As the retirement age has dropped the use of the scheme has increased. The  
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replacement rate was also improved in 1992, and the scheme now covers about 60 percent 
of all employees. Its introduction appears to be a major reason for the drop in labor market 
participation among older workers.  
  The replacement rate is different for the various types of retirement schemes, 
and this may result in economic incentives that depend on the retirement pathway used.
6 
The replacement rate varies between 60 and 90 percent for the private retirement schemes.  
  •  For disability pensions, the replacement rate is about 62 percent. In order to  
    increase employee incentives to apply, employers in many firms pay a small  
    company pension in addition to the state paid disability pension, thereby   
    increasing the replacement rate up to 80 percent.  
  •  For unemployment, the standard replacement rate is 63 percent. Several    
    firms pay an additional amount for the benefit of those employees who    
    agreed to be ”voluntarily” laid off, which can increase the replacement rate  
  substantially.   
  •  For the AFP, the replacement rate varies between 50 and 60 percent. There  
    is a new tendency on the part of some firms to provide an additional pension  
    former employees on top of the AFP pension.  
  Employers’ hiring and firing decisions with respect to older workers depend on 
factors such as their perceptions of the adaptability and productivity of older workers, and 
the wages they will have to pay them relative to younger workers. Norway currently has no 
legislation forbidding age discrimination, though the government has decided to adopt the 
relevant provisions of an EU anti-discrimination directive (2000/78/EC). A new study by 
                                                 
 
6     The replacement rate is commonly defined as the benefits-to-income ratio, or in other words the fraction of the  
        previous earnings which the benefits replace. The   replacement rate we use here is the before-tax (gross) 




Büsch, Dahl and Dittrich (2004) shows that age plays a small role in hiring decisions in 
Norway, and that little age discrimination exists. On the other hand, there is evidence that 
older workers often are given less important jobs when firms invest in new technologies 
(Lahn et al. 1999).  
  Employers are often worried about the labor costs of older workers – including 
the necessary social security contributions. Compared with other OECD countries, the age-
earnings profiles in Norway are relatively flat for both men and women, but flatter for 
women than men. This suggests that seniority wages that do not correspond to changes in 
productivity may be a smaller problem in Norway than in other countries. This could 
account for the higher employment rates for older persons in Norway than elsewhere as 
well.  
  Overall, the wage structure in Norway is very compressed, both between age 
groups and between different occupations. The social security contribution rate is also low, 
at nearly 13 percent, while in France, for example, it is over 41 percent. As of 2002, social 
security contribution rate for those over 62 are close to 9 percent.
7 Together with the 
absence of a steep seniority-based wage system, the low contribution rate works in favor of 
older workers’ employment.  
  Norway was ranked 16
th (of 30) OECD countries in the strictness of 
employment protection with respect to individual dismissals (OECD 1999). In general, 
employees in Norway cannot be dismissed just because they reach the statutory retirement 
age of 67, and they remain protected even beyond that age. Rights, and length of giving 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
 







notice, increase both with age and tenure, which could explain the relatively high 
participation rates. But it can also be a reason why employers are keen to encourage older 
worker to withdraw from employment after the age of 62 via the AFP or a disability 
pension. Strict employment protection can also make it less likely that companies will want 
to hire older workers. Unlike the policies in several other countries, no wage subsidies are 
targeted specifically at older workers. Instead, employers can receive a wage subsidy for 
hiring an unemployed person, a subsidy targeted at groups at high risk for long-term 
unemployment: immigrants, the disabled, youths, and those over 60. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Sample construction  
The analysis is based on several of Statistics Norway’s administrative registers, the most 
important of which is the “Duration Data – Social Insurance” database (Forløpsdata-trygd 
or FD-trygd), containing information on the entire working age population from 1992 to 
1997, as well as data on the labor market, social insurance states and a broad range of 
background information on individual earnings, education, experience, and family status. 
The registers are then merged with firm and enterprise data from the Register for Legal 
Units and Statistics Norway’s Business Register. Based on the employer-employee 
identification, several firm characteristics have been generated, including age and gender 
composition, share of part-time workers, and composition of the firm’s labor force by 
educational attainment level.  
  The major exit routes from work to early retirement for Norwegian worker are 
AFP or disability pension (DP). In addition, we collect other exits (such as unemployment 
benefits, private or firm-provided early retirement schemes, or being financially provided 
for by a spouse) in a third category: out of labor force (OLF). By construction, the three  
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states are mutually exclusive and absorbing, though unlike for a disability pension or being 
out of labor force, a worker needs to be of a certain age to be eligible for the AFP. The 
sample is constructed in accordance with these eligibility requirements.  
  We use data for individuals born between 1929 and 1932 during an observation 
period from 1992 to 1997. For most of the period, the eligibility age was 63: individuals 
born in 1929 turned 63 in 1992 and 68 in 1997, for example. For this cohort we may, in 
principle, observe their transitions out of the labor market until they reach the standard age 
for obtaining a pension (67). On the other hand, individuals of the youngest cohort in our 
sample were born in 1932, and became 65 years in 1997 (our final year of observation). 
Accordingly, our point of departure is the sample of workers employed at age 63, and we 
observe them for a period of 24 months, at which point their transition, if any, into early 
retirement, disability pension, or out of the labor force is registered. Employment is the 
base category and the state the workers stay in, if there is no transition into other states. 
The period of observation is thus truncated at age 65, since this allows us to include the 
youngest birth cohort in our sample.  
 
4.2 Observed shares in different states  
Before we turn to the regression analysis, we explore some empirical regularities as they 
appear from the observed transitions during the period from 63 to 65 years of age. 
[Table 1 about here] 
  Table 1 reveals an increased influx to AFP, which most likely is an effect of the 
maturing of this newly introduced early retirement option. For males with AFP eligibility, 
the employment share has decreased from 58 percent for the 1929 cohort to 46 percent for 
the 1932 cohort, while the share is about 70 percent for all cohorts outside the AFP area. 
Note that even though there is a growth in AFP of 17 percentage points, there is almost no  
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reduction in the other early retirement options: the percentage on disability pensions or out 
of the labor force have dropped by only 2-3 percentage points. Hence, AFP has had a direct 
effect on the employment rates, rather than having a substitution effect on disability. For 
males outside the AFP area, the share of those on disability (13 percent) or out of the labor 
force (18 percent) remain stable across cohorts.  
  Compared with women, the most striking difference is the high rate of 
employment for those with AFP entitlement. The decrease is about the same as for males, 
but the employment rate is 6-9 percentage points higher across the cohorts. A likely 
explanation is that women on average have acquired less pension rights than men, implying 
that the reduced pension rights conferred by the AFP scheme is a stronger disincentive for 
early retirement for women than men. This accords with the findings in Dahl, Nilsen and 
Vaage (2003), who report that the early retirement propensity for females in this age group 
is lower than for males. There is, however, a disturbing relationship between AFP and DP, 
as there is absolutely no sign of substitution between the two exit routes. 
5. Regression analyses 
In this section we present the results from regression analyses based on multinomial logit 
models. The results are reported as marginal effects together with corresponding z-values 
(see Tables 2-5). Our model allows us to condition retirement choices on a rich array of 
information about individual and firm characteristics, permitting a comparison of 
retirement behavior in sheltered versus competing industries, and in the public versus the 
private sector. Furthermore, the AFP, inasmuch as it introduced a new exit route, 
constitutes a natural experiment and gives us the opportunity to model the effect on 
retirement behavior of a more generous set of pension options . Hence, we compare the 
regression results for the employees with and without AFP eligibility, while maintaining  
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the focus on differences between sheltered vs. competing industries. As Table 1 indicates 
distinct gender differences in retirement behavior, we report separate regressions for males 
and females. We restrict the sample to the 1932 cohort, as eligibility criteria vary somewhat 
from cohort to cohort. For instance, banking and insurance was not included in the earliest 
age cohorts) but was added in the agreement in 1995. 
[Table 2 and 3 (non-AFP, males and females) about here] 
  Tables 2 and 3 report the coefficients of early retirement determinants for the 
sub-sample without AFP eligibility, the group that serves as our control group in the 
natural experiment. We report marginal effects for the probability of two exit routs: 
disability pension and out of the labor force. Because the latter is a residual group and thus 
hard to furnish with a priori interpretations, we focus primarily on the former. All estimated 
marginal regression coefficients are interpreted using employment as our basis category. 
Individual characteristics appear to have no significant impact on the probability of early 
retirement in the form of a disability pension; the exception is the positive impact from the 
indicator for full-time workers. This finding hold for both genders.  
  Next we present the influence from earnings and expected pensions. Income in 
different states gives incentives to choose between different states since the financial 
reward varies. Implicitly we assume that the individuals choose among expected income 
streams. Of course, we can only observe the income in the actual state. However, by using 
the relevant rules for the disability pension (and AFP in the next table), we are able to 
construct potential incomes in these end-states. All the various income variables are based 
on the income prior to the retirement year. Since earnings are the alternative cost of leaving 
the labor force, we expect it to have a negative impact on the disability pension. This is 
confirmed for both genders. Increased expected pension, on the other hand, is expected to 
increase the probability of early retirement, but the coefficient for males is negative and  
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significant. This variable is, however, highly correlated with earnings, and the two effects 
may therefore be hard to disentangle.  
  ‘Unemployment’ is a variable measuring the unemployment ratio at the 
municipality level. The coefficient turns out to be positive and significant. This might 
support the argument that unemployment and disability are substitutable pathways to early 
retirement, but Dahl, Nilsen and Vaage (2000) and Riphahn (1997) offer a more careful 
interpretation.
8 
  We now turn to the sector and industry indicators. First, we note that there is no 
significant difference in the probability of receiving a disability pension in the public 
compared with the private sector. Hence, there seems to be no support for the popular view 
that the private sector in itself encourages this retirement option – though there is a reduced 
probability of entering the out of labor force state for public sector employees. Nor do the 
industry indicators turn out to be strong predictors for early retirement. Among men, there 
is a (barely) significantly positive impact of working in wholesale and retail trade, and in 
building and construction on the probability of retirement through a disability pension. 
Among women, working in the health and social sector has a significant positive impact on 
their probability of disability pension retirement. As the health and social sector consists 
mostly of workers in the public sector, and to the degree that the public sector is a shelter 
against competition and downsizing, this is hard to interpret as a result of globalization. 
                                                 
8     A more general way of addressing the question of whether disability pension and unemployment benefits are 
       exchangeable pathways into early retirement, is to test whether the explanatory variables have identical effects on the 
       probability of entering the different states. Dahl, Nilsen and Vaage (2000) and Riphahn (1997) both find that most of 
       the explanatory variables have significantly different effect on the two forms of exits (although the importance of the 










  Finally, the table brings the results from including several workplace 
characteristics. Since this requires data on employers to be merged with data from their 
firms, such information is quite rare, at least in large public databases. This type of data 
allows us to test for the effects on early retirement of group effects such as number of 
employed, share of male workers, average education, etc. We find that there is a negative 
impact of firm size on the male probability of a disability pension, but the second-order 
effect is positive, indicating a diminishing negative effect. A tentative explanation is that 
large firms have better opportunities to internally replace the labor force, thereby reducing 
the employers’ push-incentives as compared with smaller firms. Moving down the table we 
find in both genders that working in firms with high mean age appears to be a protection 
against disability pension. Of course, this may be a result of selection, and the estimate 
should be interpreted with care. 
  As mentioned, the AFP reform may be regarded as a natural experiment. Even 
though the firms have had a certain opportunity of choosing themselves into the reform, it 
represents a possibility for researchers to exploit the effects of a reform that represent an 
introduction of increased generosity into the pension system. The inclusion of AFP 
together with disability pension and out of the labor force as different end-states in a 
competing risks framework permits the identification of potential differences in the 
transitions from work to early retirement. This may shed light on the discussion whether 
disability pension and AFP are substitutable retirement pathways or not. We can also 
analyse changes in sector/industry effects, i.e. whether there are less push-effects now that 
employees themselves can choose to quit, and not only be able to retire when they fulfil the 
eligibility criteria in the disability and unemployment insurance schemes.  
[Table 4 and 5 (AFP, males and females) about here]  
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  The results from this part of the analysis show that the effects of individual 
characteristics are by large the same as in Table 2 for transitions to disability pension. For 
the AFP, there are several significant coefficients, and both for males and females, 
education and full-time work are positive and significant. Highly educated persons choose 
AFP as their retirement option. The strong effect among women of being married is 
noteworthy, possibly to be explained as an assortative mating effect, inasmuch as spouses 
have common preferences. Since women generally are married to men older than 
themselves who therefore already have retired, they will have a preference to retire to 
spend more time together with their spouses (see also Dahl, Nilsen and Vaage 2003). 
Unmarried women will often not have the same preference for early retirement, as the 
workplace is a more important arena for social contact for them than for married persons. 
Married women have a substantially higher probability (26 percentage points) of taking 
AFP than do unmarried women. 
  For both genders, high income remains a strong determinant for staying in the 
labor force. In particular, there is a highly significant reduction in the probability of 
entering AFP. Increased earning reduces the probability of retirement to any form of early 
retirement, except for exit to out of labor force for males. Increasing expected pension is 
still negative for the male transition to a disability pension. For females, on the other hand, 
the coefficient now becomes positive, as we expected a priori, both for AFP and for 
disability pension. 
  Local unemployment has a positive effect on the transition to disability pension 
and out of the labor force, but we find no significant effect on the transition to AFP. This 
supports the argument that unemployment and disability are substitutable pathways to early 
retirement, and that there is an over-utilization in the form of the unemployed ending up on  
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disability pensions without being truly disabled. This may indicate, ceteris paribus, a push 
effect for persons ending in these states, while a transition to AFP is more pull-oriented.  
Work in the public sector is a strong negative predictor for transition to AFP. The reason 
for this may be that it is more common to pay a small company pension in addition to the 
AFP pension in the private sector. Collective pension schemes also have a different effect, 
as public employees who work until 65 receive a substantial increase in their pension. 
Working in the public sector is no protection for ending up on disability pension for 
females. This finding may be due to the high disability rates found among women 
employees in the public sector (e.g. in social insurance offices and the Norwegian State 
Railways; Stokke 1993). We can also observe a positive effect of working in the public 
sector on being out of the labor force for males, possibly due to a lower pension age that is 
fixed by law in some male-dominated professions (such as the police or the military), and 
some special early retirement schemes (“ventelønn”) for those over 60 in some public 
companies when they downsize or reorganize (NOU 1998: 19). 
  Turning to industrial characteristics, we observe a positive effect on the 
transition to disability pensions for males working in building and construction compared 
with all other sectors. For the transition to AFP, there are several significant results, and 
while working in the retail sector has a negative effect, work in building and construction, 
the manufacturing industry, as well as in banking and insurance, has a positive effect on the 
probability of using AFP (compared with employment). The strongest increase in transition 
rates to AFP is for employees in the banking and insurance industry, and industry that saw 
sharp downsizing during the 1990s. All effects for the transition to out of labor force are 
negative, but the significant ones are the transitions from health and social work, 
transportation, building and construction, and the manufacturing industry. There are only 
three significant effects for females, a positive one for the transition to AFP, and negative  
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ones for the transition to out of labor force from wholesale and retail trade, and from the 
manufacturing industry. 
  The workplace characteristics show no significant effect on disability pension, 
except for a negative effect of mean age in the company for females. Full-time working 
males in male-dominated firms postpone their retirement to AFP. Females in large firms 
have a high transition rate to AFP, but the effect is diminishing. Lastly, females working in 
male dominated companies have a higher transition rate to the out of the labor force state.  
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The results from our study show relatively large sex differences in early retirement 
behavior. Furthermore, it appears that the introduction of the AFP has had hardly any effect 
on the disability pension incidence. We also find differences between public and private 
sectors, and heterogeneity between industries. Downsizing sectors, such as banking and 
insurance, have significantly higher transition rates to AFP compared with other sectors. 
The variation in early retirement behavior between industries probably has to be explained 
both by push and pull factors: Some types of work are exposed to competition and subject 
to continuous change. This type of company specific knowledge has to be updated all the 
time to keep pace with the competition in the market. One can therefore surmise that 
employees working at companies particularly exposed to marketplace competition are more 
inclined to retire early than those working in companies more protected against competition 
and re-organization. 
  Surprisingly, there are few signs of push-effects in disability pension retirement, 
but the effect of unemployment is strong and significant. There are also likely push-effects 
in building and construction, manufacturing industries and banking and insurance. On the 
other hand, there are strong signs of pull-effects in AFP: It is the well-educated who expect  
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to receive high pensions who take AFP. And while the public sector appears to indicate 
push factors are significant (a less competitive environment, hence less push), this 
interpretation is most likely spurious. Instead, there is a pull-effect through the differences 
in rewards: public employees who work until 65 will receive a substantially increased 
pension.  
  If economic globalization were to have a large effect on early retirement 
behavior, we would expect the push mechanisms to dominate, but this is not the case. In 
the period for which we have data social norms connected to early retirement have changed 
(Dahl and Nesheim 1998). It has become more accepted and less stigmatizing to retire 
early, and at the same time the incentives to retire have changed through the introduction of 
the AFP. These aspects appear to be more important than globalization in explaining early 
retirement behavior in Norway.      
  Finally, the introduction of AFP in 1989 and the foregoing debate was inspired 
and influenced by international social and economic developments and trends. Indeed, a 
more flexible retirement processes was seen as a necessary consequence of the increasing 
degree of globalization. In this respect it might be argued that globalization has played a 
role in retirement process in Norway, even though the means have been pull rather than 
push factors.  
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Table 1. Observed states at age 65 for individuals that were employed when they turned 63. 
By sex and AFP eligibility. 
 
 Cohort 
  1929 1930 1931 1932 
MEN 
NON-AFP AREA: 
   Employed 
   DP 
   AFP 
   OLF 
AFP AREA: 
    Employed 
    DP 
    AFP 




















  8 % 
31 % 









  8 % 
34 % 









  9 % 
39 % 
  6 % 
WOMEN 
NON-AFP AREA: 
    Employed 
    DP 
    AFP 
    OLF 
AFP AREA: 
    Employed 
    DP  
    AFP 









  9 % 
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Expected pension      
Local unemployment 
Public sector (yes=1) 
Industry dummies 
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Firm characteristics 
  # employed 
  (# employed)
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  Share male empl. 
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AFP 
   Coeff.   Z-value 
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     1039.35 
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